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The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates
during Currency Crises: the Role of Debt,
Institutions, and Financial Openness*
Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and Benedikt Goderis
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during currency crises. We
find strong evidence that raising the interest rate: (i) has larger adverse balance sheet effects and is therefore
less effective in countries with high domestic corporate short-term debt; (ii) is more credible and therefore
more effective in countries with high-quality institutions; (iii) is more credible and therefore more effective
in countries with high external debt; and (iv) is less effective in countries with high capital account openness.
Our results support the idea that the effect of monetary policy depends on its impact on fundamentals, as well
as its credibility, as suggested in the recent theoretical literature.
1. Introduction
The role of monetary policy during currency crises has gained attention, especially in
the aftermath of the Asian crisis.The large depreciations in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia,
and the Philippines in 1997 and 1998 had detrimental effects on corporate balance
sheets and resulted in large-scale banking sector distress and economic downturn. An
important question that has been subject to debates amongst policymakers and aca-
demics ever since, is whether higher interest rates can support the exchange rate during
such crises.
The conventional view is that higher interest rates support exchange rates by dis-
couraging capital outflows and increasing the costs of speculating against the currency.
Higher interest rates can also signal the monetary authorities’ commitment to support
the exchange rate in the future (Drazen, 2003). The empirical literature, however, does
not find a clear and systematic impact of monetary policy on exchange rates. Some
studies find that tighter monetary policy appreciates the exchange rate, others find the
opposite, while some fail to find any effect.1 Most of these studies are based on
particular countries and crisis episodes. Hence, the evidence seems to suggest that, if
there is an effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during crises, it is likely to
depend on country-specific circumstances.
A small but growing theoretical literature has started to investigate these circum-
stances by looking at the various channels through which higher interest rates affect
exchange rates.Two types of arguments can be distinguished. First, higher interest rates
affect exchange rates through their impact on economic fundamentals. They might, for
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example, weaken the financial system, increase public debt, and lead to a credit crunch.
Depending on the magnitude of these adverse effects, raising interest rates could
weaken the currency, rather than strengthen it.2
The second type of argument is suggested by Drazen (2003) and relates to the
signaling of unobserved government characteristics. If raising interest rates is believed
to signal the monetary authorities’ commitment to supporting its currency, then it might
be successful. However, if it is believed to signal weak fundamentals or panic at the
monetary authorities, then the effect will be opposite.
The channels through which monetary policy affects the exchange rate have so far
received little attention in the empirical literature. The only study that uses a large
cross-section of currency crisis episodes and investigates the effect of monetary policy
on exchange rates during those episodes is Goldfajn and Gupta (2003).3 Using a dataset
of crisis episodes in 80 countries, they find that tight monetary policy increases the
probability that a real appreciation of the exchange rate occurs through a nominal
appreciation rather than an increase in inflation, but only in countries with strong
banking sectors.
This paper considers four new country-specific characteristics that could be impor-
tant determinants of the effect of monetary policy during crises and empirically tests
their importance. First, we look at domestic short-term corporate debt. Furman and
Stiglitz (1998) argue that higher interest rates can increase the likelihood of corporate
defaults by increasing debt service payments and compromising balance sheets. An
increased likelihood of defaults will also lead to a higher risk premium. If these two
effects, a higher default probability and a higher risk premium, more than offset the
higher promised return, then higher interest rates cause further capital outflows and a
weaker currency. Following Goderis and Ioannidou (2008), we argue that this monetary
policy channel is likely to be more important for countries with high short-term cor-
porate debt.The higher the level of debt, the larger the adverse effects of higher interest
rates, and thus the larger the probability that higher interest rates depreciate the
exchange rate.
Secondly, we consider the credibility of higher interest rates as a signal of the
monetary authorities’ commitment to supporting its currency. Our hypothesis is that
the credibility of government policies, and thus also the credibility of monetary policy,
increases with the quality of a country’s institutions. Countries with a stable govern-
ment, a strong rule of law, and a high-quality bureaucracy, will be better able to credibly
commit. As a result, the same monetary policy decision might have different effects on
the exchange rate, depending on the institutional setting within which it is taken.4
Thirdly, we consider foreign currency denominated (“external”) debt. The recent
theoretical “third-generation” or “balance sheet” currency crisis literature has stressed
the importance of external debt, both as a determinant of crises and as a determinant
of the costs of crises.5 The effect of external debt on the interest rate–exchange rate
relationship, however, has received less attention. Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) argue
that high external debt increases the costs of a depreciation because of its effect on
corporate balance sheets. As a result, monetary authorities have stronger incentives to
support their currency, even if that is costly as well. Our hypothesis is that these
stronger incentives contribute to the credibility of higher interest rates, as they make
continued support of the currency more likely.
Finally, we investigate capital account openness. An alternative to raising interest
rates that is sometimes advocated is the use of capital controls in order to limit capital
outflows. Given that the monetary authorities’ power is constrained by their foreign
reserves and their willingness to keep interest rates at a high level for a long time,
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capital controls might make it more feasible for the authorities to support their cur-
rency. In countries with full capital account mobility, the intensity and sheer volume
of speculation make it increasingly difficult for the monetary authorities to counter-
balance it. Hence, our hypothesis is that monetary policy is less effective in countries
with high capital mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methodology and
data. Section 3 discusses the main estimation results. Section 4 describes various robust-
ness checks, addresses concerns of endogeneity, and investigates the economic
importance of our results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology and Data
Following Kraay (2003), we define the onset of a currency crisis as a large nominal
depreciation or devaluation preceded by a relatively fixed nominal exchange rate:
i t de k de ki t i i t i, ,, ,( ) > <and (1)
where dei,t is the monthly percentage change in the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis
the anchor currency6 in country i between periods t and t - 1; ki is the threshold
determining the minimum size of the devaluation; dei t, is the average absolute per-
centage change in the exchange rate in country i in the 12 months prior to t; and k̄ i is the
threshold determining the maximum size of the allowable exchange rate volatility prior
to the devaluation. Following Kraay (2003), ki is set to 5% (10%) for OECD (non-
OECD) countries, while k̄ i is set to 1% (2.5%) for OECD (non-OECD) countries. To
prevent double-counting, we eliminate episodes that were preceded by episodes in the
preceding 12 months. This procedure is applied to all countries for which we have data
and yields a list of start dates. We identify the end as the first month after the start in
which speculative pressures have substantially diminished compared to their earlier
peaks: for crises starting in month t, we define endings as the first month t + s (s > 0) for
which the following holds:
s s s s ji t s j i t i tMAX i t, , , ,. ( ), , , ,+ + < + ∗ − =0 25 0 1 2 (2)
where si,t+s+j is the nominal money market interest rate7 spread over the US Federal
Funds rate in country i and month t + s + j where t and s denote the starting month and
the length of the crisis, respectively. s̄i,t is the average spread8 in the 24 months preced-
ing month t, and si tMAX, is the mean of the three highest levels of spreads in month t and
the five succeeding months. In order to eliminate periods in which a relatively fixed
exchange rate was abandoned without substantial financial turmoil, we exclude six
periods for which the difference between si tMAX, and s̄i,t does not exceed three percent-
age points, as they exhibit only a limited degree of speculative pressure.9 This procedure
yields a panel of 18 crisis episodes.10 Using this panel, we analyze the effect of monetary
policy on the exchange rate using the following specification:
Y X Z X Zi t i t i t k i t i t k i t, , , , , , ,= + + + ′ +− − − −β β β β ε0 1 1 2 3 1 (3)
where Yi,t is an indicator that captures the change in the exchange rate in month t for
country i; Xi,t-k is an indicator that captures changes in the stance of monetary policy;
and Zi,t-k is a vector that includes episode-specific fundamentals that are expected to
affect the exchange rate (e.g. international reserves, business cycle, etc.), where k = 0,
1, . . . , n. Finally, the interaction term of Xi,t-1 and Zi,t-k captures how the effect of
monetary policy changes for different levels of fundamentals. The interaction terms
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of monetary policy with domestic short-term corporate debt, institutional quality, exter-
nal debt, and capital account openness are used to test the central hypotheses of the
paper.
We use two indicators for the change in the exchange rate.The first, NE, captures the
change in the nominal exchange rate and equals the percentage change in the monthly
average local currency price of the German mark (US dollar) for European (non-
European) countries (IFS, line rf). The second, RE, captures the monthly percentage
change in the real exchange rate.The real exchange rate is constructed by adjusting the
nominal exchange rate for domestic and German/US price levels (IFS, line 64).
As for the change in monetary policy, Xi,t-k, several measures have been proposed.
Kraay (2003) uses the discount rate as it is largely controlled by the monetary authorities
and therefore better proxies monetary policy than other interest rates. By contrast,
Goldfajn and Gupta (2003) prefer money market interest rates, as discount rates often
remain flat during interest rate defenses. Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) point out that
the best available indicator of monetary policy is not necessarily the same across
countries or time and therefore collect information on the most appropriate indicator for
each of their sample episodes. In this paper we use two monetary policy indicators. Our
preferred indicator, MP, is based on the country-specific interest rates collected by
Goderis and Ioannidou (2008)11 and is constructed as follows.We first collect daily data
on the country-specific interest rates.We construct monthly averages of these series and
express them as spreads over the anchor country’s interest rates (Federal Funds rate for
the US and discount rate for Germany). We then take the monthly percentage changes
in these spreads and lag them by one month. Following Kraay (2003), our second
indicator,DISC, is based on the discount rate (IFS, line 60) and is constructed in the same
way as MP. Lagging the monetary policy indicator allows the transmission of monetary
policy to take some time and limits concerns of reverse causality. For both measures of
monetary policy we include the initial level of the spread as a control variable.
We next turn to the episode-specific fundamentals, Zi,t-k. Six fundamentals are taken
from Kraay (2003) and Goderis and Ioannidou (2008). First, as an indicator of real
exchange rate overvaluation, we include the average percentage growth rate of the
real exchange rate vis-à-vis the anchor country during the previous 12 months. An
average real appreciation implies a loss of competitiveness and increases the likelihood
of a depreciation to restore competitiveness. Secondly, we include nongold reserves as
a percentage of total imports in the previous month (IFS, lines 1L.D and 71.D).
Reserves can be used to support the exchange rate and hence higher reserves are
expected to strengthen the currency. Thirdly, as an indicator of a country’s external
payments position, we include the average of a country’s outstanding IMF loans as a
percentage of its quota in the previous 12 months (IFS, lines 2TL and 2F.S).A high level
of IMF loans might discourage investors to lend to a country or persuade those already
present to leave, which depreciates the exchange rate. Fourthly, we include the devia-
tion of real per capita GDP growth in the previous calendar year from the average of
the five years before (World Development Indicators,WDI). Lower growth might lower
international investors’ expectations of future returns and might make it more difficult
for a country to meet its external debt service obligations. Again, this could lead to a
decrease in demand for the domestic currency, causing a depreciation. Finally, we
include the monthly percentage change in real exports and imports in the previous
month (IFS, lines 70.D and 71.D). Higher exports increase the supply of foreign
currency which, everything else equal, appreciates the exchange rate. By contrast,
higher imports increase demand for foreign currency and thus depreciate the exchange
rate.
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To test our central hypotheses, we also include measures of domestic short-term
corporate debt, institutional quality, external debt, and capital account openness. For
domestic short-term corporate debt, we follow Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) and
collect data on short-term debt and total assets for a large number of publicly listed
companies in developed and emerging markets from the Thomson Financial’s World-
scope database. We construct an aggregate measure of a country’s short-term debt by
taking the mean of the individual short-term debt to total assets ratios in the calendar
year before the year of the exchange rate change. To capture the quality of a country’s
institutions we use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating, which is a
weighted index of 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political (50%), financial
(25%), and economic (25%). The index includes measures of, for example, the quality
of a country’s bureaucracy, the degree of corruption, the degree of democratic account-
ability, the stability of the government, and the degree of law and order. The index
ranges from 0 for very bad institutions to 100 for very good institutions.As an indicator
of a country’s external debt position we use external debt over GDP, taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, in the calendar year before the year of
the exchange rate change. External debt consists of all public, publicly guaranteed, and
private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt, owed to
nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.12 Finally, we use the
(updated) Chinn and Ito (2005) index as an indicator of capital account openness. This
index was constructed using information on multiple exchange rates, current account
transactions, capital account restrictions, and the requirement of the surrender of
export proceeds, taken from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions.13
Table 1 reports summary statistics. On average, the nominal and real exchange rates
depreciated during the episodes in our sample, while monetary policy on average
tightened.14 The standard deviation of DISC is lower than the standard deviation of
MP, which is consistent with the argument above that discount rates tend to remain
flatter than other monetary policy indicators.
3. Estimation Results
We performed Hausman tests, F -tests, and Lagrange multiplier tests to compare fixed
effects, random effects, and pooled OLS estimation.The results did not reject the use of
pooled OLS. Hence, Table 2 reports pooled OLS estimation results for six alternative
specifications based on equation (3). Column (1) shows results when using the mon-
etary policy indicator DISC and fundamentals but no interaction terms. Monetary
policy enters with a positive sign, indicating that an increase in interest rates leads to a
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. This effect is statistically significant at 5%
and supports the revisionist view that higher interest rates weaken the home currency
during currency crises.
Four control variables enter with expected signs but only one is significant.
External debt enters with a positive sign and is significant at 5%, indicating that higher
external debt depreciates the exchange rate, which is consistent with the recent balance
sheet crisis literature. Capital account openness enters with a positive sign and is
significant at 1%, suggesting that higher openness depreciates the exchange rate.
Exchange rate overvaluation enters with a negative sign, indicating that an overvalued
exchange rate leads to a depreciation. Finally, the growth rate of exports enters with a
negative sign, suggesting that higher exports appreciate the exchange rate. The other
control variables do not have the expected signs.
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Column (2) shows the results when using our preferred monetary policy indicator
MP. We again find that an increase in interest rates depreciates the nominal exchange
rate.This effect is somewhat smaller than before and statistically significant at 10%.The
control variables enter with the same signs as before except for the level of the spread
which is now positive and significant at 1%, indicating that higher levels of the
spread correspond to nominal exchange depreciations. The coefficients of debt to
total assets, external debt, capital account openness, and GDP growth are no longer
significant.
In columns (3) and (4) we add interaction terms of monetary policy with all funda-
mentals except institutional quality to test whether the effect of monetary policy
depends on these fundamentals. Three of the hypotheses in this paper—increasing the
interest rate to support the exchange rate is less effective in countries with high
domestic corporate short-term debt, low external debt, and high capital account
openness—are tested using the interaction terms of monetary policy with (domestic
corporate) short-term debt to total assets, external debt, and capital account openness.
Column (3) shows results when using the monetary policy indicator DISC. Monetary
policy again enters positive but is no longer significant. Its interactions with short-term
debt to total assets, external debt, and capital account openness all enter with the
expected sign, confirming the hypotheses that monetary policy is less effective for
higher short-term debt, lower external debt, and higher capital account openness.
However, these effects are insignificant, except for the interaction of external debt,
which is significant at 10%. The interaction terms of monetary policy with the other
fundamentals all enter insignificant as well. This is consistent with Kraay (2003), who
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
NE 163 0.03 0.11 -0.24 0.45
RE 163 0.01 0.10 -0.23 0.41
Monetary policy
MP 163 0.06 0.33 -0.87 2.04
DISC 123 0.03 0.17 -0.27 0.96
MP-domestic 163 0.03 0.24 -0.86 1.45
MP-foreign 163 -0.01 0.04 -0.24 0.09
Fundamentals
Debt to total assets 163 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.45
Institutional quality 163 0.66 0.13 0.41 0.87
External debt 163 0.37 0.30 0.01 1.58
Capital account openness 163 0.07 1.00 -1.09 2.07
Exchange rate overvaluation 163 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.14
Reserves to imports 163 6.22 4.56 0.68 22.14
External payments position 163 1.21 1.72 0.00 6.63
Deviation GDP growth 163 -0.02 0.05 -0.20 0.10
Exports growth 163 0.01 0.14 -0.71 0.43
Imports growth 163 -0.01 0.16 -0.52 0.54
Initial level of spread (MP) 163 0.25 0.42 0.05 4.60
Initial level of spread (DISC) 130 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.66
Note: This table reports summary statistics for all variables used in estimation.
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Table 2. Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MP 0.05* -0.23*** 0.42* 0.43*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.20) (0.21)
DISC 0.14** 0.07
(0.05) (0.15)
Debt to total assets -0.23** -0.10 -0.30* -0.14 -0.22 -0.24*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
Institutional quality 0.18 0.12
(0.13) (0.10)
External debt 0.10** 0.02 0.10* 0.02 0.09 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Capital account openness 0.02*** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.35 -0.04 -0.30 -0.34 0.06
(0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.38) (0.24)
Reserves to imports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
External payments position -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Deviation GDP growth 0.45** 0.14 0.42 0.12 0.26
(0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
Exports growth -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Imports growth -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Initial level of spread -0.01 0.09*** -0.06 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.09) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Monetary Policy ¥ Debt to
total assets
0.87 2.01*** 1.18** 1.25**





Monetary Policy ¥ External
debt
-0.83* -0.34 -0.26* -0.28*
(0.43) (0.26) (0.13) (0.13)
Monetary Policy ¥ Capital
account openness
0.04 0.08* 0.03* 0.03
(0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
























Number of observations 123 163 123 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20
Notes: The dependent variable is NE. Robust standard errors are clustered by crisis episode and are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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also fails to find any evidence of a nonlinear effect of monetary policy. The fundamen-
tals enter with the same signs as in column (1).
As argued by Goldfajn and Gupta (2003), discount rates often fail to reflect impor-
tant changes in monetary policy. Moreover, using a universal monetary policy interest
rate fails to recognize that different countries use different key interest rates as part of
their monetary policy strategy. It is therefore interesting to investigate if and how our
findings change when using our preferred country-specific monetary policy indicator
MP. Column (4) shows the results. Monetary policy now enters negative and is statis-
tically significant at 1%. Its interaction with short-term debt to total assets enters with
the expected sign and is also significant at 1%. This indicates that monetary policy is
more effective in countries with low levels of domestic corporate short-term debt. The
interaction of monetary policy with capital account openness enters with the expected
sign as well and is significant at 10%, suggesting that monetary policy is more effective
in countries with low capital account openness. Finally, the interaction of monetary
policy with external debt also enters with the expected sign but is not significant. The
coefficients of the control variables are very similar to the coefficients in column (2).
The remaining interaction terms all enter insignificant, except for the interaction of MP
with the level of reserves.
We next consider institutional quality as a determinant of the efficacy of monetary
policy. Column (5) reports the results when adding the interaction of monetary policy
with institutional quality. The interaction terms other than the ones of interest are
dropped due to multicollinearity. All four interaction terms enter with the expected
signs and are all statistically significant. The interaction of monetary policy with short-
term debt remains positive and enters significant at 5%, while the interaction of
monetary policy with external debt remains negative but is now significant at 10%.
The interaction of monetary policy with capital account openness again enters posi-
tive and is significant at 10%, although the coefficient is somewhat smaller. Finally, the
interaction of monetary policy with institutional quality enters with a negative sign
and is significant at 5%. This indicates that monetary policy is more effective in coun-
tries with good institutions. While monetary policy was negative and significant in
column (4), it now enters positive and significant at 10%. The change in the coefficient
of monetary policy shows that the negative and significant effect in column (4) can be
attributed to the institutional quality and external indebtedness of countries. Once we
control for these two variables, the coefficient of monetary policy changes sign. Insti-
tutional quality by itself enters positive but is not significant. The other regressors
enter with the same signs and significance as in column (4), except for exchange rate
overvaluation.
The goodness of fit in columns (1) to (5) is quite low, given the large number of
regressors. In column (6) we therefore drop the six control variables that are insignifi-
cant. The results are very similar. Monetary policy as well as its interactions with the
four fundamentals enter with the same sign, similar size, and the same level of signifi-
cance as in column (5). The only exception is the interaction of monetary policy with
capital account openness, which has the same coefficient but is no longer significant.
Summarizing, the results in Table 2 provide evidence that the efficacy of monetary
policy in supporting the exchange rate during currency crises depends on a country’s
domestic corporate short-term debt, institutional quality, and external debt. Everything
else equal, monetary policy is more effective in countries with lower corporate short-
term debt, higher levels of institutional quality, or higher external debt. We also find
some evidence that monetary policy is more effective in countries with low capital
account openness.
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4. Sensitivity Analysis
We next investigate the robustness of our results and address the endogeneity of
monetary policy. First, we consider the interest rate spreads that we used to construct
the monetary policy indicators in Table 2. Using these spreads allows us to eliminate
changes in domestic monetary policy that result from monetary policy changes in the
anchor country, i.e. the monetary policy changes that are not expected to affect
the exchange rate but instead are aimed at keeping the exchange rate stable.
However, this implies that in principle our results could be driven by either changes
in the domestic interest rate or the anchor country’s interest rate or by both. Since
we are primarily interested in testing whether higher domestic interest rates support
the exchange rate, it is important to investigate whether our results do indeed stem
from domestic rather than foreign monetary policy changes. Hence, we separate our
preferred monetary policy indicator MP into a domestic monetary policy indicator,
which is the lagged percentage change in the monthly average of the domestic inter-
est rate, and a foreign monetary policy indicator, which is the lagged percentage
change in the monthly average of the anchor country’s interest rate. Column (1) of
Table 3 reports the results of the specification in Table 2, column (6), when replacing
the monetary policy indicator MP with the domestic and foreign monetary policy
indicators. The results are reassuring as they clearly show that the results in Table 2,
column (6), are driven by domestic monetary policy. MP-domestic enters positive and
is significant at 10%, which is consistent with MP in Table 2, column (6), while
MP-foreign is not significant. Moreover, the interactions of MP-domestic with debt to
total assets, institutional quality, external debt, and capital account openness all enter
with the same signs and are all significant, while the same interactions for MP-foreign
are all insignificant.
Table 3, column (2), tests whether our results are robust to the inclusion of a time
trend. During crises, exchange rate depreciation is typically highest in early months and
lower in later months. The negative and highly significant coefficient of the time trend
confirms this. However, the coefficients for MP and the interactions of MP with the
fundamentals of interest are very similar to column (6) of Table 2, and gain significance.
The interactions of MP with debt to total assets and institutional quality are now
significant at 1%, while the interaction of MP with capital account openness is signifi-
cant at 5%. As an additional robustness check, we also investigated the possibility that
the impact of monetary policy varies across crisis months but found no evidence that
this is the case.
We next test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable. The results are reported in Table 3, column (3). The lagged exchange rate
change enters positive and is significant at 10%. The other coefficients are very similar
to the ones in Table 2, column (6). Both MP and the interactions of MP with debt,
institutions, and openness are significant, while the coefficient on the interaction of MP
with external debt has a similar size but is now insignificant. Columns (4) to (7) repeat
the specifications in Table 2, column (6), and Table 3, columns (1) to (3), but with the
real instead of the nominal exchange rate change as the dependent variable.The results
are very similar.
An econometric concern is that monetary policy could be endogenous, causing our
estimates to be biased. Kraay (2003) and Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) use the per-
centage change in real reserves to instrument for monetary policy. However, this
instrument is a rather poor predictor of monetary policy in our sample. In the absence
of other strictly exogenous instruments, we use the system GMM estimator developed
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by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond
(1998). Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to first transform the model by first differ-
encing to eliminate possible individual effects and then apply instrumental variables. In
particular, endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags
of their own levels and first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) extended this
difference-GMM estimator by adding the equations in levels to the system, creating
Table 3. Estimation Results—Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged exchange rate change 0.12* 0.10
(0.06) (0.09)
Time trend -0.42** -0.33**
(0.14) (0.13)
MP 0.42** 0.44* 0.36* 0.34* 0.37*





Debt to total assets -0.23 -0.19* -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.18 -0.20
(0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14)
Institutional quality 0.13 0.17* 0.15 0.21* 0.23* 0.25** 0.22*
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
External debt 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital account openness 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial level of spread 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MP ¥ Debt to total assets 1.16*** 1.12** 1.27*** 1.20*** 1.15**
(0.39) (0.50) (0.37) (0.33) (0.49)
MP ¥ Institutional quality -0.72*** -0.72** -0.64** -0.65** -0.67**
(0.24) (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26)
MP ¥ External debt -0.23* -0.24 -0.23* -0.19 -0.20
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16)
MP ¥ Capital account
openness
0.03** 0.03* 0.03* 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)






















MP-foreign ¥ External debt -0.64 -0.06
(2.75) (2.36)




Number of observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.20
Notes: The dependent variable is NE in columns (1) to (3) and RE in columns (4) to (7). Robust standard errors are
clustered by crisis episode and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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what is often called the system-GMM estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that
exploiting the additional moment conditions of the system GMM provides dramatic
efficiency gains.
We use system-GMM to address the endogeneity of all regressors, including the
lagged dependent variable.15 In the transformed equation we instrument regressors
with lags of their own levels, while in the levels equation we instrument regressors with
lags of their own differences. For example, we instrument monetary policy at time t - 1
with levels and differences of monetary policy and the other regressors at time t - 2.All
other regressors are instrumented in the same way. The number of instruments can
potentially grow large, which causes problems of overfitting and can weaken the Sargan
test of instrument validity up to the point where it generates implausible good p-values
of 1.00. Roodman (2006) suggests two steps to limit the instrument count. First, we only
use instruments at t - 2 and leave out all instruments beyond t - 2. Secondly, we “col-
lapse” the instrument set, which means that we create one instrument for each variable
and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance.
Table 4, column (1), reports the system-GMM results for the specification in Table 2,
column (6). The results strongly confirm our earlier results. Monetary policy and its
interactions with short-term corporate debt, institutional quality, external debt, and
capital account openness all enter with the expected signs and are now all significant at
1%. The p-value of the Sargan test of instrument validity is 0.71, which indicates that
the null of valid instruments cannot be rejected. Finally, at the bottom of column (1) we
report the test statistics for the Arellano–Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests of serial corre-
lation in the error terms. If the error terms in the untransformed model are serially
uncorrelated, then the differenced error terms in the differenced model should show
negative first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation. The
Arellano–Bond AR(2) test statistic is negative but far from significant, suggesting the
absence of substantial serial correlation in the error terms of the untransformed model.
This is important as it supports the assumption that, even if lagged levels of the
regressors are endogenous, i.e. correlated with the corresponding lagged error terms,
they are not correlated with the contemporaneous error terms.
Table 4, column (2), reports results when adding the lagged dependent variable,
which again enters positive and is significant at 10%. The results for monetary policy
and its interactions are similar to column (1), although the interaction with external
debt is now only significant at 10%. Debt to total assets and institutional quality are
now significant but have the counterintuitive sign. External debt is significant at 10%
and enters with the expected sign.The Sargan test again does not reject the null of valid
instruments. However, the p-value is now quite high, which could be due to overfitting.
The AR tests again indicate the absence of serial correlation in the error terms of the
untransformed model.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the specifications in (1) and (2) but with the real rather
than the nominal exchange rate change as the dependent variable.As before, results are
strongly robust.
Finally, we experiment with an alternative measure of external debt. A depreciation
of the exchange rate inflates the local currency value of all foreign currency denom-
inated debt on balance sheets, regardless of its maturity. However, this balance sheet
deterioration might be more problematic for short-term external debt, as this needs to
be repaid or rolled over much sooner. Given that crises typically do not last longer than
two to three years, monetary authorities might be more concerned about short-term
than about total external debt. To investigate this possibility, we re-estimate the speci-
fications in Tables 2 to 4, using short-term external debt instead of total external debt.16
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Our results are strongly robust. In the specifications with MP and the interaction of MP
with short-term external debt, the latter always enters with a negative sign and is now
always significant at 5%, while significant at 1% for all specifications in Tables 3 and 4.
Short-term external debt always enters positive and is significant at 10% in two speci-
fications. Our results for the other interaction terms go through and in some cases also
gain significance.
Summarizing, our sensitivity analysis shows that the nonlinear effects of monetary
policy with respect to corporate short-term debt, institutions, and capital account
openness are robust to the separation of monetary policy in its domestic and foreign
components, the inclusion of a crisis-specific time trend or lagged dependent variable,
and the use of system-GMM. The results for the interaction of monetary policy with
external debt are slightly less robust, although it enters with the expected sign and is
always significant in the system-GMM estimations. Moreover, when using short-term
Table 4. Estimation Results—System GMM Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged exchange rate change 0.16* 0.12
(0.08) (0.10)
MP 0.48*** 0.51** 0.42*** 0.46***
(0.18) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17)
Debt to total assets -0.35 -0.53* -0.42 -0.55**
(0.38) (0.28) (0.33) (0.24)
Institutional quality 0.00 0.33** 0.31 0.54***
(0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14)
External debt 0.02 0.11* 0.08 0.14**
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Capital account openness -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Initial level of spread 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
MP ¥ Debt to total assets 1.87*** 1.78*** 1.78*** 1.71***
(0.32) (0.53) (0.35) (0.55)
MP ¥ Institutional quality -0.86*** -0.93*** -0.80*** -0.88***
(0.24) (0.30) (0.22) (0.25)
MP ¥ External debt -0.43*** -0.38* -0.36*** -0.34*
(0.15) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18)
MP ¥ Capital account openness 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of observations 163 163 163 163
Number of crisis episodes 16 16 16 16
Number of instruments 20 22 20 22
p-Value Sargan test 0.71 0.94 0.54 0.87
Arellano and Bond AR(1) test -1.55 -2.03** -1.60 -2.20**
Arellano and Bond AR(2) test -0.74 0.12 -0.78 -0.05
Notes: The dependent variable is NE in columns (1) and (2) and RE in columns (3) and (4). Robust standard
errors are clustered by crisis episode and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. System GMM refers to the Arellano–Bover (1995)/Blundell–Bond
(1998) one-step system GMM estimator. Forward orthogonal deviation transformation is used to eliminate
fixed effects. To limit the number of instruments, the instrument sets are collapsed and only the first lags are
used in the transformed and the levels equation.
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instead of total external debt, the interaction term is always significant. These results
strongly support the central hypotheses of this paper. The impact of higher interest
rates on exchange rates during currency crises depends importantly on a country’s
short-term corporate debt, institutional quality, external debt, and capital account
openness.
We next investigate the economic relevance of these results, using the results in
Table 4, column (1), by calculating the marginal effects of monetary policy for different
levels of fundamentals. Panels (A) to (D) in Figure 1 illustrate these marginal effects
for different levels of short-term corporate debt, institutional quality, external debt, and
capital account openness, when evaluating the other three at their median. The ranges
of levels for debt, institutions, external debt, and capital account openness correspond
to the ranges in our sample. The solid lines represent the marginal effects, the dashed
lines represent the 95% confidence interval.The upward-sloping solid line in panel (A)
shows how the marginal effect of monetary tightening increases with debt. For the
lowest debt levels, the marginal effect is negative and significant, indicating that raising
the interest rate appreciates the exchange rate. For higher debt levels (above 0.13) the
effect becomes positive, implying that raising the interest rate depreciates the exchange
rate. For debt levels above 0.14, this effect is statistically significant at 5%. For most debt
levels, this effect is also economically relevant. For example, the marginal effect of an
interest rate increase in countries with a sample average debt level of 0.18, is equal to
0.09. This means that raising the interest rate change by one percentage point leads
to an increase in the nominal depreciation by 0.09 percentage points.
Panel (B) shows the same graph for institutional quality.The downward-sloping solid
line shows how the marginal effect of higher interest rates decreases for higher levels
of institutional quality. For levels of institutional quality up to 0.74, raising interest rates
depreciates the exchange rate, while for very high levels the effect changes sign and
higher interest rates appreciate the exchange rate. The latter effect is significant at 5%
for institutional quality above 0.84. Again, for most levels of institutional quality, the
marginal effect is economically relevant. For a country with average institutions of 0.66,
raising the interest rate change by one percentage point depreciates the exchange rate
by an additional 0.08 percentage points.
Panel (C) shows how the marginal effect decreases for higher external debt levels.
The graph differs from the others as for most of the external debt levels, the marginal
effect of monetary policy is negative, i.e. raising interest rates appreciates the exchange
rate. However, almost all observations in our sample are located within the left half of
the graph. The right half of the graph contains only one observation: the maximum
external debt level in our sample (1.58) which corresponds to Indonesia in 1998.
Looking at the left half of panel (C) only, the marginal effect is again positive for most
external debt levels and only turns negative for external debt levels above 0.45. For the
median external debt level of 0.33, raising the interest rate by one percentage point
depreciates the exchange rate by an additional 0.05 percentage points.
The upward-sloping solid line in panel (D) shows that the marginal effect of mon-
etary policy increases with capital account openness and is always positive. For mean
openness of 0.07, raising the interest rate by one percentage point depreciates the
exchange rate by an additional 0.06 percentage points.
Finally, we use the results in Table 4, column (1), to predict the marginal effects of
higher interest rates in each of our crisis episodes. Panel (E) shows the results.The mar-
ginal effect is negative in six crisis episodes and positive in all others. In five of these six
crisis episodes, the marginal effect is also significant at 5%: Finland (1991), Philippines
(1997), Slovakia (1998), South Africa (1998), and Venezuela (1995). This suggests that
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during these episodes tighter monetary policy to support the exchange rate would have
been effective. For four episodes, the predicted marginal effect of higher interest rates is
not significant:Mexico (1998),Norway (1986),Russia (1998),andVenezuela (2002). And
for all other episodes, raising the interest rate is expected to depreciate the exchange
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Figure 1. Marginal Effect of an Interest Rate Increase for Different Levels of Debt,
Institutions, External Debt, and Capital Account Openness
Notes: Figure 1 is based on Table 4, column (1). Panels (A) to (D) show the marginal effects of
an increase in MP for different levels of each of the four fundamentals, when evaluating the other
three at the median. Panel (E) shows the predicted marginal effect during each of the crisis
episodes, using the episode-specific median levels of the four fundamentals.A value of 0.20 on the
vertical axis indicates that raising MP by 1% point leads to an increase in NE of 0.20% point.
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rate: Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Indonesia (1997), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994),
South Africa (2001), and Thailand (1997). The result that monetary policy is counter-
productive in the majority of episodes, is consistent with the positive and significant
coefficient in Table 2, column (2), where we did not control for nonlinear effects.
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined four new country-specific characteristics that could be impor-
tant determinants of the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during currency
crises. We tested four central hypotheses: (i) raising the interest rate has larger adverse
balance sheet effects and is therefore less effective in countries with high domestic
corporate short-term debt; (ii) raising the interest rate is more credible and therefore
more effective in countries with high-quality institutions; (iii) raising the interest rate
is more credible and therefore more effective in countries with high external debt; and
(iv) raising the interest rate is less effective in countries with high capital account
openness. Using data for currency crisis episodes between 1986 and 2004, we find strong
and robust evidence to support our hypotheses. Using our estimation results, we predict
that monetary policy would have had the conventional supportive effect on the
exchange rate during five of the crisis episodes in our sample, while it would have had
the perverse effect during seven other episodes. For four episodes, we predict a statis-
tically insignificant effect. Our results support the idea that the effect of monetary
policy depends on its impact on fundamentals, as well as its credibility, as suggested
in the recent theoretical literature. They also provide an explanation for the mixed
findings in the empirical literature.
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Notes
1. See for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Dekle et al. (2002), Goldfajn and Baig (2002),
Goldfajn and Gupta (2003), Kraay (2003), Zettelmeyer (2004), and Caporale et al. (2005).
2. See for example Drazen and Masson (1994) and more recently Furman and Stiglitz (1998),
Lahiri and Végh (2003, 2007), and Flood and Jeanne (2005).
3. Other studies investigate whether high interest rates defend currencies during speculative
attacks. While Kraay (2003) finds no significant effects, Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) find that
for low levels of corporate short-term debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of crisis,
while for higher debt this effect decreases and eventually reverses.
4. The role of institutions has recently gained attention in the crisis literature. Shimpalee and
Breuer (2006) find strong evidence that corruption, government instability, and a lack of law and
order increase the probability of a crisis.
5. See for example Schneider and Tornell (2004).
6. Historically, European countries typically pegged to the German mark whereas non-
European countries often pegged to the US dollar. Hence, we use the monthly average local
currency price of the German mark for European countries and the local currency price of the
US dollar for all other countries (International Financial Statistics (IFS) line rf).
7. IFS line 60b.
8. We exclude months that lie more than two standard deviations above the mean, in order not
to count episodes of distress related to the upcoming crisis.
9. Denmark 1993, Ireland 1993, Korea 2000, Spain 1995, Sweden 1992, and United Kingdom
1992.
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10. Argentina 2002:1–2002:10, Brazil 1999:1–1999:5, Finland 1991:11–1993:2, Indonesia 1986:9–
1989:2 and 1997:8–1999:6, Ireland 1986:8–1987:5, Korea 1997:11–1998:7, Mexico 1994:12–1996:8
and 1998:9–1999:4, Norway 1986:5–1988:8, Philippines 1997:9–1997:12, Russia 1998:9–1998:11,
Slovakia 1998:10–1999:12, South Africa 1998:7–1999:3 and 2001:12–2004:6, Thailand 1997:7–
1998:7, and Venezuela 1995:12–1996:6 and 2002:2–2003:7. We used nongold reserves as an
indicator of speculative pressure for Slovakia and Venezuela (1995–96). Slovakia (1993:7) was
excluded since it was due to the separation of Czechoslovakia.
11. See Table 2 in the working paper version (Goderis and Ioannidou, 2006). For Ireland we use
the discount rate, identified from the central bank website. The data source is Datastream.
12. For Finland (1991) and Norway (1986) data are from IFS. For Korea (1997) data are from
McLeod and Garnaut (1998).
13. We thank Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito for making this index available.
14. We dropped January 1998 for Indonesia from our sample as the nominal and real exchange
rate depreciation in this episode (96.8% and 84.5%, respectively) represent an outlier.
15. We use the xtabond2 procedure in Stata (Roodman, 2005).
16. Short-term external debt was taken from WDI and includes all debt having an original
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. For Finland (1991), Korea
(1997), and Norway (1986), we multiply total external debt by the domestic corporate short-term
debt to total debt ratios.
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